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Representation through corporatisation:
municipal corporations in Italy as arenas for
local democracy1
G IUL IO C I TRON I
1*, ANDREA L I P P I 2 AND STE FAN IA PROFET I 3
1Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Calabria, Arcavacata di Rende (CS), Italy
2Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Firenze, Florence, Italy
3Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
The literature on Public Utilities has increasingly shown that the adoption of corporate
governance tools for the management of public services in local policy-making has given rise
to a considerable reshaping of political strategies and practices. Corporatisation should be
understood as not merely a policy instrument, but also as a new opportunity for local
politicians to adjust their preferences, to deal with various interests, and to build unusual
coalitions. Corporatisation may (and does) influence the concrete operation of local political
systems. Today, the boards of municipal enterprises, as well as the public–private
partnerships stemming from this emerging tendency towards corporatisation, can be
conceived as both actors of local policy-making and arenas in which a number of functions
traditionally associated with the mechanisms of electoral representation are performed:
inter- and intra-party bargaining, recruitment of élites, and negotiation with local and
‘external’ stakeholders. The paper illustrates the impact of corporatisation on local
representation mechanisms in Italy, considering its opaque side with specific reference to the
problem of democratic accountability and control, and the creation of new local oligarchies.
Empirical evidence is provided from research on municipal enterprises in six different Italian
regions. Statistical data on companies (amount of social capital, fields of activity, private
and public shareholders, etc.), as well as qualitative data, are analysed in order to show how
corporatisation has provided local actors with unusual (and often non-transparent) channels
of political representation and public–private bargaining.
Keywords: corporatisation; local governments; public utilities; governance; political
representation; interest representation
Introduction
Corporatisation is currently understood by scholars as the process by which local
and national governments create private-law companies (corporations) to carry out
functions which they previously managed in-house or through public-law bodies
* E-mail: giulio.citroni@unical.it
1 This article is the product of tight collaboration among the three authors. However, for the sole
purpose of administrative attribution of authorship, we specify that Andrea Lippi wrote paragraphs 1 and 4,
Giulio Citroni wrote paragraph 3, and Stefania Profeti wrote paragraphs 2 and 5. Conclusions were written
together by the three authors.
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and agencies. This process may or may not lead to the subsequent sale of some or all
of the shares in the new company, privatisation being distinct from corporatisation.
Today, the phenomenon is widespread, and ‘the literature overflows with explana-
tions for this change in public sector organization’ (Christensen and Pallesen, 2001:
283–284), focusing in particular on the genesis and development of corporatisation in
the domain of public services.
As such, corporatisation should be considered a policy instrument contributing to
efficiency (Thynne, 2010) on the basis of the New Public Management (NPM)
assumption ‘that the best, or even only, way to obtain better results from public-
sector organizations is to adopt some sort of a market-based mechanism to replace
the traditional bureaucracy’ (Peters, 2001: 23). In accordance with this idea,
corporatisation has been studied as part and parcel of the NPM phenomenon aimed
at improving performance of public services, and numerous publications have
analysed the transformation of public-owned firms into public–private partnerships
(PPPs) and its impacts (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007; Grossi and Reichard,
2008), sometimes including side-effects and unintended consequences (Hodge and
Greve, 2009; Citroni et al., 2012).
Among such unexpected outcomes, many authors have found that corporatisation
creates greater degrees of freedom for discretionary power and gives considerable
room for manoeuvre to politicians. In this view, almost paradoxically, market-like
instruments can be strategically exploited to strengthen – or at least to maintain –
governments and the elected political class. The generalized political acceptance
(and implementation) of corporatisation ‘in search of efficiency’ goes well beyond
NPM’s performance arguments. As Christensen and Pallesen (2001: 285) maintain,
‘politicians [will] prefer corporatisation and privatization to traditional public
sector organization, if they can reap political benefits that outweigh the political
costs involved’. These unexpected consequences of private-law companies are more
visible in specific countries, like Italy, where the state’s political commitment
has been contradictory and the legal framework has been redundant, creating
opportunities for bottom-up interpretations by municipalities (see section ‘Beyond
management instruments: municipal enterprises as opportunities for political
“reinvention” in Italy’).
This article accepts this argument by pointing out that corporatisation may
become a locus of politics, and especially political representation, whenever the
companies can be shaped and used by both public and private stakeholders as
political arenas in which to pursue political aims instead of economic ones. The
initial hypothesis of this article is that corporatisation is not only a business-like
managerial policy instrument; it also provides opportunities for political repre-
sentation, so that a fashionable political framework inducing corporatisation in a
managerialist direction may give rise to political arenas where local democracy is
reshaped (Pollitt et al., 2007).
In order to test this hypothesis against the more conventional NPM-efficiency
arguments, after a short review of the literature in section ‘Political representation in
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municipal corporations: a theoretical background’, the article focuses on municipal
corporations in Italy, providing data on
(a) The variety of local paths towards corporatisation and their rationales, considering
the general features of private-law municipal companies, that is, their territorial
distribution, financial resources, sectors of activity, territorial borders (see ‘Beyond
management instruments: municipal enterprises as opportunities for political
“reinvention” in Italy’ section). A pure managerial and instrumental use of
corporatisation testifying to the search for more efficiency should be revealed by
homogeneous recourse to private-law companies mainly, if not exclusively, in
profitable market sectors (namely utilities) and by the size growth (both financial
and territorial) of such companies to meet higher industrial and financial standards.
(b) The average composition of companies’ share capital, in terms of both numerical
representation (‘heads’) and financial weight (‘shares’) of public, private, and
‘mixed’ shareholders (see ‘Municipal corporations as arenas of governance (and
representation): public, private and “mixed” shareholders’ section). The argument
that privatization is necessary in order to increase investments and reduce burdens
on public budgets should be accompanied by significant amounts of private capital
in the companies’ shareholdings.
(c) The various categories of actors that make up the public, private, or mixed quotas,
respectively, and their presence in, and financial contributions to, the various public
service sub-sectors (with a focus on local utilities, on the one hand, and social
services on the other), in order to determine what kinds of arenas and interest
representation, if any, are developing in the companies’ shareholdings [see
‘Municipal corporations as arenas of governance (and representation): public,
private and “mixed” shareholders’ section].
(d) The criteria used to select board members, considering the composition of the
Boards of Directors (BoDs) of six private-law companies (one for each region)
operating in the public utilities sector (see ‘Who governs public services?
Governance structure and members’ resources in six companies’ BoDs’ section).
In this case, a genuine managerial attitude towards corporatisation should be
accompanied by the predominance of boards of members with clear managerial and
professional profiles.
The empirical evidence is drawn from an original dataset of all the 1335 private-law
companies owned fully or partly by municipalities in a sample of six different
regions selected over two dimensions in order to maximize variability and account
for context diversity: (a) the territorial divide, crucial in the Italian case, among the
North (the regions of Lombardy and Emilia Romagna), Centre (Tuscany and
Latium), and South (Campania and Apulia); (b) the political orientation and
stability of the regional political systems: three regions with traditionally stable
political systems ‘dominated’ by the same ‘invulnerable’ political coalitions since the
mid-1990s (Tuscany and Emilia Romagna – centre-left; Lombardy – centre-right);
and three regions with less stable and more contestable political systems (although
all three regions had a centre-left majority when we selected the six cases in 2008).
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Political representation in municipal corporations: a theoretical background
In the past 20 years, corporatisation has received close attention from scholars in
the social sciences at large, and especially in the literature on administrative reforms,
which has explored the changing nature of the public administration on the eve of
the 21st century. Since the early 1990s several studies have identified the spread of
NPM ideas as the force behind corporatisation. In fact, relying on private-law
companies instead of in-house mechanisms to manage and deliver local public
services fits well with the ‘4Ms’ philosophy (maintain, modernize, marketize, and
minimize the system: see Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000) and its declared objectives:
increasing flexibility through removing hierarchical coordination mechanisms;
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public intervention by introducing
private style instruments; reducing the burden on public budgets; and distancing
management from political roles.
Corporatisation thus stands at the crossroads between the development within
the public administration of managerial strategies – for instance, the introduction of
market-like policy tools, and a clear-cut separation between the roles of purchasers/
regulators (public authorities) and providers (private and/or public firms) – and
governments’ commitment to progressive privatization of formerly public enterprises.
Although technically corporatisation only implies formal privatisation of municipal
undertakings, that is, their transformation into private-law entities, in several
European countries (in particular Italy, Germany, Spain, and France), this strategy
has been increasingly paralleled with material privatization, that is, the partial
divestment of public capital through involving private capital (Bel and Fageda,
2010; Wollmann and Marcou, 2010). Corporatisation and privatization in its two
meanings are often intertwined in the pro-market rhetoric promoted by many
supra-national organisations, such as the World Bank, in their guidelines to remedy
the fiscal crisis of the state (O’Connor, 1973), and with the lack of investments and
innovation in public services, on the one hand, and the poor performance of many
public undertakings, especially in the utilities sector, on the other (Calabrò, 2011;
Osborne, 2011).
According to other scholars, by contrast, the generalized political acceptance of
the corporatisation ‘creed’ goes well beyond NPM’s efficiency and effectiveness
arguments. And it also extends beyond the theoretical advantages associated with
material privatization. Indeed, the unintended consequences and paradoxical effects
of NPM-driven reforms (including the re-politicisation of managerial issues) have
been emphasized by a number of empirical studies (see Hood and Peters, 2004). The
cost reduction and other benefits claimed by privatization supporters are rarely
supported by sound empirical evidence in several domains (see Bel and Warner,
2008 for a review on waste and water services); and concerns about regulatory
issues have been raised by prominent policy analysts (Baldwin et al., 2011).
On this view, almost paradoxically, the development and use of market-like
instruments in public administration may also be interpreted (and better understood)
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as a strategy to reinforce governments and the elected political class. This may
happen for a number of reasons. First, the shift from old forms of public ownership
as regulation to more modern forms of ownership and arm’s-length regulation
makes governments ‘freer than previously to consider and select from a suite of
organisational possibilities’ (Thynne, 2010: 5–6). Second, the recourse to private-
law companies instead of public-law ownership may provide governments with
‘considerable freedom from close public oversight and control, legislative and
otherwise’ (Thynne, 2010: 7). Moreover, the creation of free-standing legal entities
gives governments greater discretion in deciding whether to restructure or partially
divest companies’ share capital (eventually substituting previous costs with expected
returns), to create inter-governmental collaborative ventures, or to establish PPPs or
other forms of strategic alliance (Thynne, 2010).
Corporatisation may also be attractive because of the benefits that it offers to the
political class, especially when elected politicians are ‘puzzling over’ (Heclo, 1974)
supranational or national pressures for reform, or when they are faced by situations
of short-term political uncertainty (and possibly failure), such as those caused by
public finance shortages and administrative overloads (King, 1975; Peters, 1981). In
such critical situations, the shift from direct public intervention to the creation of
private-law companies at arm’s length from political power may seem appealing
because it may enable politicians to distance themselves from potentially unpopular
activities in a context of poor financial resources, thus avoiding responsibility and
shifting the blame (Fiorina, 1986) for policy errors or unsatisfactory services on to
managers (Christensen and Pallesen, 2001; Yamamoto, 2004).
Furthermore, the creation of companies separated from the bureaucratic machine
goes hand in hand with the establishment of new bodies (such as the companies’
BODs) whose members are selected and appointed by the governments. Amid an
enduring and generalized crisis of legitimacy of political parties and other identity-
based forms of representation (Katz and Mair, 2002), this extension of ‘public
office’ appointments may create enticing opportunities for politicians and party
leaders to distribute selective incentives among their supporters/allies or within
their own party (Pollitt et al., 2005: 20). They can thus enhance their personal
empowerment and develop new channels for recruitment of the political class.
Finally, corporatisation may also provide municipalities with opportunities to
create or strengthen partnerships with other public institutions (public–public
partnerships) or with different kinds of private actors (PPP) through joint share-
holding. Besides the extreme flexibility, which characterizes municipal corporations
in several European countries (e.g. Germany, Spain, France, as well as Italy), the
growing success and development of mixed companies is probably one of the most
interesting features shared by those countries. As several authors have pointed out
(see e.g. Bel and Fageda, 2010), local governments view joint ownership via mixed
companies as an appealing solution because it may be the optimal combination with
which to mitigate the disadvantages of pure public ownership and full privatisation.
In the local utilities sector, for example, private partners tend to be large firms with
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extensive know-how that conduct day-to-day operations, while local governments –
and politicians – are able to retain some degree of control over the firm thanks
to their status as shareholders. Company boards and shareholder assemblies may
thus become hybrid arenas in which cooperation between public and private
shareholders assumes a wide variety of forms, but all of which are different from
both the institutional kinds of interests representation and informal practices of
public–private bargaining.
It is with this literature in mind that we consider the Italian case. The next sections
analyse the regulation and current diffusion, ownership structure, and managerial vs.
political outlook of municipal corporations. The analysis will show the room for
manoeuvre available to mayors, and the ways in which they have used it, thereby
shedding light on the multi-faceted nature and drivers of so-called ‘municipal
capitalism’ (Gavana et al., 2007).
Beyond management instruments: municipal enterprises as opportunities for
political 'reinvention' in Italy
The shift from a conjectured instrumentality of private-law companies to their
different and unexpected use for local policy and politics is particularly apparent in
Italy, where the creation of private-like municipal companies has been progressively
embedded in local ties by administrators, elites, and private players. This has
been brought about by strong bottom-up influence and weak top-down steering
due to fragmented legislation and the absence of coordination by the state in
the implementation phase. In this section, we illustrate this context and the way
in which corporatisation has taken place in Italy by considering: (a) the weak
legal framework – which has never compelled corporatisation – that left room for
manoeuvre, and (b) the implementation of corporatisation by the municipalities,
which havemade ample use of it inmany forms and formany different policy-making
purposes (e.g. inter-municipal cooperation, partial privatisation, administrative
reform).
Weak top down legislation
Over the past one and a half centuries, three acts of parliament have dealt directly
and explicitly with the regulation of municipal enterprises:
– law 103 of 1903 (Legge Giolitti), reforming local government and formally
acknowledging so-called aziende municipalizzate (public-law municipal enterprises),
municipal bodies (a) acting under the full responsibility of the municipality that
established them, and (b) furnishing public utilities on behalf of that municipality;
– law 142 of 1990, again reforming local government and changing the status of
aziende municipalizzate into aziende speciali, granting these greater autonomy in
their budgeting procedures and their own legal personality, and imposing principles
of effectiveness, efficiency, and budget balancing;
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– law 127 of 1997 (Legge Bassanini bis), which, among other things, empowered
municipalities to transform aziende speciali into private-law joint-stock companies
(società per azioni), thus acknowledging full-fledged corporatisation.
None of these pieces of legislation appear decisive in explaining corporatisation: all
three, in fact, sanctioned phenomena, which had already come about in practice (the
creation of municipalizzate in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the increasing
autonomy and economic outlook of municipalizzate, and the transformation of
a number of them into private-law companies in the early and mid-1990s); and
none has forced municipalities to create municipalizzate or to transform them into
joint-stock companies, they have only allowed them to do so.
In the absence of binding, overarching legislation on corporatisation, some
impetus for creating municipal companies came from legislation on public services.
Legislation on compulsory competitive tendering, independent regulation and
purchaser/provider split, inter-municipal cooperation in service delivery, unbundling
of service production processes, and full cost recovery have been on the agenda since
the early 1990s. Moreover, norms favouring tendering or limiting recourse to
in-house provision have been included in budget laws2 or other ‘omnibus’ bills.3
All the norms approved, however, have either been disallowed by the Constitutional
Court and subsequently revised, have left ample margins of manoeuvre at the
local level, or have been repealed by a referendum. Numerous bills have also been
discussed but never approved.4
Sector-specific regulation has beenmore effective, although its overall effects have
been piecemeal and incremental. Beginning in 1990 with the discussion on what
would later become the ‘Galli’ law on the water sector (no. 36/1994), decrees 22
(‘Ronchi’, on waste disposal) and 422 (‘Burlando’, on public transport) of 1997,
and decrees 79 of 1999 (‘Bersani’) and 164 of 2000 (‘Letta’) on electricity and gas,
respectively, all followed. All these measures (to mention only the most important
for each sector) have envisaged some form of separation between service delivery
and regulation, partial or full cost recovery in service delivery, inter-municipal
cooperation within ‘optimal territorial districts’, and the unbundling of activities to
allow for varying degrees of liberalisation.
Not only is this normative structure rather complex: it is also the product of an
ongoing process of reform, stop-and-go intervention, revision and correction of
norms. Compulsory cooperation in ‘optimal territorial districts’, which was at the
2 Most notably Laws 448/2001 and 133/2008.
3 Most recently, ‘Ronchi’ Law n. 166/2009 and the ‘Spending review’ decree 95/2012.
4 Several bills have been proposed over time: ‘Napolitano’ (1997), ‘Vigneri’ (1999–2000), ‘Lanzillotta’
(2006), titled according to the name of the proposing Member of Parliament. All these proposals have
envisaged some more or less cogent form of compulsory competitive tendering, and the regulation of its
operational aspects, as well as some form of public regulation of the services thus contracted out. However,
none of these bills has reached the stage of final approval: the presence of Rifondazione Comunista in left-
wing cabinets, and of Lega Nord in right-wing ones, appears to have generally prevented drastic options for
liberalisation.
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core of water and waste regulations, is now being dismantled by a norm contained
in a budget law, which envisages regulation by provincial administrations as a less
expensive alternative. Deadlines and obligations to switch to competitive tendering
or to create regulatory bodies have been repeatedly postponed. Complex and
ambiguous loopholes, as well as very weak monitoring and control by national
authorities, have given municipalities large room for manoeuvre.
Strong bottom-up implementation
Within a contradictory and indecisive legal framework, Italian local governments
have been very active in adapting to, and taking advantage of, weak regulation.
Implementation has seen the bottom-up emergence of local strategies which sys-
tematically point to an ‘escape from public law’ towards a totally different set of
rules. All this evidence testifies to a political use of companies instead of an eco-
nomic one, and it shows the existence of a political space for representation which
we investigate in the remaining sections.
In what follows, we describe the political characteristics of implementation in light
of the diversity of local uses of private-law companies, and especially as regards:
– the increasing creation of private-law companies by municipalities from the bottom
up without effective guidance or control by central or regional authorities;
– the uneven distribution of private-law companies across regions, demonstrating how
pre-existing cultural and institutional factors – and not just efficiency-maximisation
drives – have affected local policies in different parts of the country;
– the spread of corporatisation across a broad range of policy sectors, well beyond the
expected mission of public utilities and involving policy sectors generally associated
with the distribution of resources and ‘traditional’ bargaining between governments
and private stakeholders (e.g. education, health, training);
– the fact that a conspicuous number of Italian municipalities do not invest large sums
of money in corporations, but rather have a high propensity to invest small shares in
numerous corporations endowed with limited capital, reducing the potential of
each firm;
– the propensity by municipalities to use companies as tools for networking, through
the establishment of public–public and PPPs in the form of joint-stock companies.
The creation of these companies is a widespread phenomenon in Italy, as well as in
other European countries (see Wollmann and Marcou, 2010; Bortolotti et al.,
2009): a recent survey by the Court of Accounts (Corte, 2010) counted 5860 bodies
(companies or otherwise) fully or partially owned by 5928 Italian municipalities
(out of about 8000), testifying to a constant increase in their number since the
mid-1990s (see also Citroni et al., 2012). A more recent survey has recorded 5512
firms (Unioncamere, 2011), showing an increase from 4806 in 2003 to 4874 in
2005. Hence, although no legislative act has ever compelled local administrations to
create municipal corporations, a tendency towards their greater use is quite clear.
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The importance of corporatisation is confirmed when we look more closely
at municipal companies in the six regions in the dataset (Table 1): here we find
740 companies directly owned by municipalities and 595 companies indirectly
owned by the same municipalities (i.e. owned at least partly by one or more of the
previous 740 companies), whose share capital accounts for over 8 billion euros of
municipalities’ money and more than 14 billion overall. In all, 41% are limited
companies, 48% are joint-stock companies, and the rest are ‘consortia’ – that is,
companies meant to provide goods and services only to the partners and not for
the market. A large number of municipalities are involved in this system, with
an average of 2.5 companies each, reaching an average of 9.5 companies for
municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants (Citroni et al., 2012). This
recourse to private-law companies totally or partially owned by municipalities is
particularly high in Italy compared with other EU countries, paralleled only by
Germany (Wollmann and Marcou, 2010).
However, the large presence of municipal corporations and the dominance of
market-oriented legal forms are not necessarily unequivocal indicators of the existence
of a genuine private, market-oriented rationale behind the creation of private-law
companies. Instead, several ‘signals’ seem to point in the opposite direction.
A first indicator that using such companies may respond to a wide range of
specific local strategies, and not to a ‘given’ and consistent new paradigm for reform
of administrative action, is the markedly uneven distribution of municipal
corporations across the country, as our data show with reference to regions in the
North (Lombardy and Emilia Romagna), Centre (Toscana and Latium), and South
(Campania and Apulia) of Italy (Table 1): Southernmunicipalities, in fact, appear to
make more limited use of such companies – and to contribute significantly smaller
amounts of money – than do the Northern and Central municipalities. This is
probably due to the persistence of the well-known cleavage between the political
and administrative traditions of the Italy’s twomacro-areas (see e.g.: Putnam, 1993;
Fargion et al., 2006; Vassallo, 2013).
The strategic dimension of corporatisation is further confirmed by municipalities
resorting to private-law companies for purposes well beyond those explicitly
Table 1. The population of companies in the Citygov database – year: 2008
Region
Companies
directly owned
Companies
indirectly owned Total N
Municipal capital
(in €)
Total share capital
(in €)
Lombardy 169 171 340 2,812,055,622 4,887,604,891
Emilia-Romagna 234 145 379 1,801,949,929 2,900,846,252
Tuscany 211 160 371 924,975,949 1,764,341,328
Latium 45 74 119 2,055,449,170 3,856,456,524
Campania 43 25 68 358,593,707 437,801,500
Apulia 38 20 58 119,405,282 156,654,657
Total 740 595 1335 8,072,429,659 14,003,705,152
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envisaged by the national legislative framework, that is, management and delivery
of local utilities. In fact, corporations involved in the public services domain absorb
75% of the municipal share capital, but numerically they represent just 35% of the
total, the remaining 65% being spread over many other sectors, such as research
and training, economic development, infrastructures, housing, and so on (Table 2).
It therefore seems that municipal political actors perceive corporatisation as a tool
that is sufficiently flexible and convenient to govern most policy areas, and which if
necessary can be adapted to local policy-making needs.
Variations in local strategies of corporatisation, as well as indications on the
‘frail’ market dimension of many Italian municipal corporations, also emerge from
descriptive statistics concerning municipal share capital (Table 3). Not only is the
range between the minimum and maximum shares impressively wide, but the
distribution is markedly asymmetrical and skewed towards lower values: in half of
the cases (companies), in fact, municipal shares are less than €2665 (a little more
than €33 for companies involved in public services) and the median value is much
lower than the mean (both in general and in public services only), the latter being
increased by a few but very large municipal shares contributed by the largest
Italian cities.5
Not surprisingly, the total amount of money that a municipality decides to
contribute strongly co-varies with its size (r = 0.94). What is more surprising,
however, is that although the relation between ‘corporate attitude’ and municipal
size remains positive and significant, it tends to weaken significantly if we consider
the number of companies in which the municipality participates (r = 0.18). These
data, combined with those in Table 3, clearly show that a conspicuous number of
Italian municipalities do not invest large sums of money in corporations, thus
exhibiting a weak propensity for genuine market action; but, at the same time, they
Table 2. Fields of activity of municipal companies in the six regions (Citygov
database, 2008)
Number of companies
(%)
Capital owned by municipalities
(%)
Infrastructure, construction, real estate 15% 7%
Pharmacy 4% 2%
Research, training, consultancy? 17% 3%
Public services 35% 75%
Economic development 15% 11%
Other 4% 1%
na 10% 0%
Total 100% (1335) 100% (€ 8,072,429,660)
5 The maximum value shown in Table 3, in fact, is the share capital that the municipality of Rome
contributes to ACEA, a joint-stock company in which Rome has a 51% shareholding.
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do not miss opportunities to play the ‘corporatisation game’, in a sort of ‘così fan
tutti’ (thus do they all) fashion. This of course raises the difficult question of what
the specific reasons may be.
The question becomes evenmore challenging if we consider that no less than 17%
of the 740 companies directly owned by municipalities have been created by a single
municipality, with no other partners involved in the share capital. Single-
municipality companies are mainly used in the public services sector (22%),
which may be partially explained by the existence of specific sub-sector regulations
promoting the creation of private-law municipal companies (and pharmacies (33%),
which represent a traditional field of municipal enterprise in Northern Italy) –
but they are also important in sectors such as economic development (11%) and
infrastructure (16%), two policy areas in which the municipality could have used
an internal office for what it now does with a private-law company. This is an
interesting figure which calls for closer attention and further qualitative research in
order to determine the political reasons for this policy.
Municipal corporations are also used as a means to foster partnerships among
public institutions, be they municipalities or other public partners such as Regions,
Provinces, Chambers of Commerce, etc.: 32% of the 740 directly owned companies
have several public partners, not private ones. This holds especially for local
utilities, following a rationale related to the achievement of economies of scale and
savings in management costs, and complying with specific requirements of inter-
municipal cooperation set by the national regulations on specific services, such as
water and waste management. Indeed, public–public partnerships are rather com-
mon also in other policy sectors (especially economic development, infrastructure,
and research and training), with a significant proportion of companies (74%)
resulting from inter-municipal cooperation either in its pure form or combined with
the presence of other public partners. Indeed, as previous studies have demon-
strated, corporatisation in itself is the main vehicle for inter-municipal cooperation
in Italy. It is far more common and than institutional, formal arrangements
(municipal associations, etc.) envisaged by national legislation on local government
reform (Citroni et al., 2013).
However, inter-governmental networks created through corporatisation are
still largely local in nature. Although corporatisation may also serve as a new
and flexible form of inter-municipal cooperation, only rarely do municipalities
contribute money to, and buy shares in, companies located outside their provinces;
Table 3. Descriptive statistics on companies’ municipal shares (Citygov database,
2008)
Min Max Median Mean
All sectors 0.41 1,265,622,563 26,650 1,208,100
Public Services 1 1,265,622,563 33,187 1,499,351
Representation through corporatisation in Italy 73
at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755773914000058
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Universita degli Studi di Firenze, on 21 Nov 2016 at 09:37:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
and hardly ever do they own capital in companies that lie in regions different from
their own. Table 4 shows that this is particularly the case of large municipalities,
while at the other extreme the smaller ones find it very difficult to establish their own
companies in their own territory. The most recurrent pattern of cooperation is thus
a network with the largest municipality (usually the provincial capital) at the centre
and neighbouring small and medium-sized municipalities gravitating around it,
with predictable differences in their strategic attitudes towards corporatisation.
Last, municipal corporations in Italy may also take the form of PPPs: over half of
the companies in our database are PPPs, and although slightly under-represented in
public services, they are widely employed in important fields such as research and
training, economic development, and infrastructure. The opening of shareholdings
to private actors is frequently justified by the need to enhance the efficiency of
companies and to augment their capital. In other words, PPPs seem very attractive
regardless of real financial benefit.
In sum, in light of these data we may say that corporatisation is primarily a
strategy adopted by municipalities to ‘reinvent’ their policy-making style, to protect
themselves against various ‘environmental’ challenges (scarcity of financial resources;
increasing social demands; uncertain and contradictory national legislation on local
autonomy, etc.), and to provide local administrators with room for manoeuvre (e.g.,
loosening controls exercised by the elected assemblies and the opposition parties) in
their inter-institutional relations. In other words, Italian municipalities seem to have
tailored the private-like instruments and rationales promoted by the paradigm of
public administration to their needs, although case studies on specific companies
operating in the local utilities sector (see e.g. Citroni et al., 2008) suggest that the
concrete outcomes of such a strategy are often far from those intended.
Municipal corporations as arenas of governance (and representation): public,
private and ‘mixed’ shareholders
Private law companies have been extraordinary opportunities for local administrators
to rearrange policy-making through corporatisation by stretching its functions well
Table 4. Share of capitals owned by municipalities in companies lying outside their
terrirory (Citygov database, 2008)
Inhabitants
Capital outside the territory
of the municipality (%)
Capital outside the territory
of the province (%)
Capital outside the territory
of the region (%)
Up to 5000 97.7 23.1 1.0
5001 to 30,000 80.2 19.0 0.3
30,001 to 100,000 36.8 13.1 0.0
Over 100,000 6.2 5.3 0.0
Total 25.1 9.2 0.1
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beyond its mission. As such, private-law companies have in practice become
something other than pure and simple for-profit organizations or firms devoted to
service delivery; they also become attractive places for bargaining and coalitions,
recruiting élites among private and public milieus, and gaining consensus and
support from key local stakeholders. Hence private-law companies can also be seen
as arenas for governance and as additional (and far from procedurally democractic)
places for representation.
In this section, we provide empirical evidence for this contention by analysing the
composition of company boards. We identify emerging configurations that indicate
whether and to what extent private-law companies are spaces for representation.
A quantitative analysis of the composition of the Italian municipal companies’ share
capital is the core of this section. The balance between the roles of public and private
shareholders in assemblies is used to indicate representation. Tables 5–7 and
Figure 1 present data on the ownership structures of the companies in the dataset.6
All (11,000) shareholders have been classified as ‘public’ (municipalities, other
public bodies, publicly owned companies, etc.), ‘private’ (private enterprises, banks,
foundations, individuals, etc.), or ‘mixed’ (mixed, public–private companies or
consortia).
Using this classification, we consider (a) the relative percentages of shares owned
in municipal corporations by each category of shareholders, and (b) the relative
percentages of ‘heads’, that is, of the number of shareholders falling in each
category.While the ‘shares’ express the financial weight of the various shareholders,
the ‘heads’ reflect their numerical representation within the companies’ shareholder
assemblies. The distinction between these two dimensions is important because,
although in joint-stock companies majority rules are based on shares and not on
heads, a large numerical presence of private shareholders, even with minority
shareholdings, may be of importance for the overall governance of companies (and
for policy-making). This is for twomain reasons: first, all shareholders participate in
the appointment/election of the company’s board and its chairperson, second,
participation in the shareholder assembly provides private actors opportunities
to meet representatives of local governments, to bargain with them outside the
conventional loci of representative democracy, and to consolidate their relation-
ships with local institutions. The balance between public and private heads is thus
important for understanding what kinds of decisional and representative arenas
develop within companies, and the extent to which they differ from the ‘ordinary’
policy subsystems normally associated with the policy domains in which companies
operate. For this reason, we shall complete our analysis of company shareholders by
providing (c) a more specific description of who private and public partners are, and
where they invest their money.
6 Aggregate data are limited to the six Italian regionsmentioned above, and they refer to all the companies
in which at least one municipality located in those regions is a direct or indirect shareholder.
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Table 5. Private, mixed, and public capitals in municipal corporations: absolute values (1000 Euro) and % of shares (Citygov
database, 2008)
(€*000) Private Mixed Public Total
Economic development 269,950 13% 383,698 18% 1,431,092 69% 2,084,740 100%
Construction, infrastructures, housing 550,510 31% 153,485 9% 1,065,058 60% 1,769,053 100%
Pharmacy 50,712 20% 355 0% 202,000 90% 253,067 100%
Research, training, consulting 50,510 7% 223,514 33% 402,612 60% 676,636 100%
Other (e.g. parking, commerce) 14,121 10% 869 1% 127,880 90% 142,869 100%
Public services 672,710 6% 2,002,724 19% 7,700,959 74% 10,376,393 100%
Total 1,608,512 11% 2,764,645 18% 10,929,600 71% 15,302,757 100%
Subsectors of public services
Gas, energy 467,431 20% 1,483,816 65% 329,454 14% 2,280,702 100%
Water and sanitation 52,628 3% 370,681 24% 1,095,217 72% 1,518,526 100%
Water and sanitation + energy 0 0% 60 2% 3825 98% 3885 100%
Multiutility 31,033 1% 49,098 1% 3,495,116 98% 3,575,246 100%
Telecommunications 25,387 43% 29,370 50% 4202 7% 58,959 100%
Waste + environment 43,175 10% 60,058 13% 350,657 77% 453,890 100%
Waste + energy 7929 19% 0 0% 33,211 81% 41,140 100%
Transport 43,904 2% 6162 0% 2,368,762 98% 2,418,829 100%
Social services + cemet.s 1104 19% 62 1% 4708 80% 5874 100%
Other 119 1% 3417 18% 15,805 82% 19,341 100%
Public services (total) 672,710 6% 2,002,724 19% 7,700,959 74% 10,376,393 100%
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Table 6. Public shareholders: % of shares (S) and heads (H) by sector of activity (Citygov database, 2008)
Municipalities Public Consortia
Other local
governments
Public-owned
companies Others institutions* Total
%S %H %S %H %S %H %S %H %S %H %S $H
Gas, energy 49.3 64.3 0.7 2.8 0.1 1.4 49.5 22.2 0.1 9.7 100 100
Water and sanitation 74.5 93.9 0.1 0.6 8.5 1.3 15.4 3.4 8.8 1.8 100 100
Water/sanitation + energy 89.0 50.0 8.4 10.0 2.7 30.0 0 0 100 100
Multiutility 94.3 95.0 3.7 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.3 2.3 0.1 2.2 100 100
Telecommunications 5.0 48.0 15.0 5.1 20.0 45.5 35.0 6.3 1.9 100 100
Waste, environment 90.8 90.5 0.8 1.4 2.4 0.9 5.7 6.1 2.4 1.4 100 100
Waste + energy 73.8 94.3 7.4 1.9 15.9 2.8 7.4 1.9 100 100
Transports 95.8 85.4 0.3 0.5 1.8 2.8 2.0 9.5 1.9 4.1 100 100
Social services, cemet.s 39.0 81.3 1.3 57.4 12.5 3.6 6.4 100 100
Other 3.2 43.5 32.0 1.6 0.2 1.6 62.3 48.4 0.4 4.8 100 100
Total public services 61.0 70.3 9.4 3.4 2.6 3.1 25.7 17.2 3.1 7.6 100 100
*Other institutions: municipal associations, chamber of commerce, public agencies, other types of local governments, mountain communities.
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Table 7. Private shareholders: % of shares (S) and heads (H) by sector of activity (Citygov database, 2008)
Private consortia Banks
Multi-national
companies
Individual
person
Private
companies
No profit
organisations* Total
%S %H %S %H %S %H %S %H %S %H %S %H %S %H
Gas, energy 0.8 1 1.5 1.8 20 1 0.5 45.3 77.2 49 0 3 100 100
Water and sanitation 40.4 3.4 1.3 1.7 2.4 1.7 0.1 6.8 55.4 83.6 0.5 2.8 100 100
Multiutility 45 0.2 17 1.3 2.6 94 35.4 4.5 0 0 100 100
Telecommunications 0.1 12.5 100 87.5 0 0 100 100
Waste, environment 1.1 4 2.2 4 0.7 3.3 6.3 13.3 78.2 64.7 11.5 10.7 100 100
Waste + energy 5.1 8.3 64.1 16.7 30.5 66.7 0.3 8.3 100 100
Transports 5.9 0.9 2 0.7 7.9 1.3 0.7 74.1 81.2 21.4 2.4 1.7 100 100
Social services, cemet.s 0.1 1.3 2.6 55.7 8.3 10.1 20.7 32.9 100 100
Other 0.1 3 0.3 12.1 35.8 63.6 63.8 21.3 100 100
Total public services 10.4 1.1 3.3 2.5 10.6 2.7 1.5 34.9 55.8 50.1 18.5 8.8 100 100
*No profit organisations: foundations, associations, clubs, committees, cooperatives, groups of interests.
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Figure 1 (a) Comparing shares and ‘heads’ in municipal corporations: % of shares and
shareholders (Citygov database, 2008). (b) Comparing shares and ‘heads’ in municipal corporations
(subsectors of public services): % of shares and shareholders (Citygov database, 2008).
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A matter of public money
Inspection of financial contributions to the companies’ share capital (Table 5)
shows that municipal corporations are primarily a matter of public money: on
average, about 71% of shares consist of public capital (10.9 billion euros), while
private quotas amount to just 10.5% (1.6 billion euros), and quotas owned by
‘mixed’ entities to 18% (2.8 billion euros). The dominance of public shares is even
higher in companies involved in the management and delivery of public services,
where public capital amounts to 74% and private money to just 6.5%.
If we look at specific policy areas and different types of public service, we observe
that the percentage of private capital is higher in some sectors, such as construction
and infrastructure (31%) and, with regard to local utilities, telecommunications
(43%) and gas and energy (20%) – that is, those public services most affected by
European provisions to foster liberalization and free market competition. This
does not imply, however, that municipalities and other public institutions are not
interested in such domains: rather, they choose to invest in them indirectly,
as demonstrated by the very high percentage of mixed shares (about 50% in
telecommunication and 65% in gas and energy). By contrast, in water and sanitation
services, waste management, and especially local transport and multi-utilities (both
‘pure’ multi-utilities and companies combining water or waste management with
energy provision), the share capital is almost totally and directly controlled by
public institutions, with a very residual weight of private funds (Table 5). These data
show that municipalities have acted differently in different sectors. Water, waste
management, and local transport are different from gas and energy provision: private
investors appear to be more interested in the latter, while municipalities appear to
want to maintain stronger direct control over the former.
The over-representation of private stakeholders
Analysis of public, private, and mixed shares is also interesting from another
perspective: Figure 1a and 1b compare the percentages of shares owned by each
category of owners (‘shares’) against the percentages of owners themselves (‘heads’).
This comparison indirectly, but very effectively, describes the role of each category
of actor and the average investment made by each of them.
Figure 1a shows that 49% of owners of all companies in the dataset are private
subjects, but they only contribute 11% of the money. Public shareholders represent
47%, but they contribute 71% of the capital. Mixed companies count four times as
much in money than they do in numbers: they are the ‘richest’, or somehow ‘most
generous’, contributors.
The presence of private actors is particularly large not only in those sectors where
their financial contribution is substantial, such as gas and energy (heads = 51.7%)
or social services (48.5%), but also in multi-utility companies (47%) and local
transport (38.2%), where private shares amount to less than 2%. The only
significant ‘anomaly’ is represented by telecommunication companies, where the
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percentage of private heads halves to 22.2% compared with the amount of private
shares. But this exception does not invalidate the general tendency towards
numerical representation of private actors greater than their financial weight. It
should also be noted that, in some policy areas, the large amount of private heads is
accompanied by a percentage of mixed heads which is particularly low if compared
with the large amount of mixed shares. We may thus hypothesize, on the one hand,
that mixed companies represent a sort of ‘safe’ for municipalities, since they enable
them to diversify their shareholdings without increasing direct expenditure; and, on
the other, that public–private corporations themselves are few but ‘rich’ players in
some policy sectors (such as energy), so that they should be analysed as both actors
in the corporatisation game and arenas for it.
Public and private shareholders
‘Public’, ‘private’, and ‘mixed’ capital are three broad labels that we use to distin-
guish among shareholders according to their ‘nature’. With reference to subsectors
of local public services, Tables 6 and 7 show the different types of actors that
make up such groups, and their financial and numerical importance within their
respective categories.7
Public shareholders. Since our analysis focuses on companies partly or totally
owned by Italian municipalities, it is not surprising to find that municipalities are the
leading actors among public shareholders for both financial contribution (70.3%)
and numerical representation (61%), with peak values in multi-utilities, water and
sanitation, waste management and local transport (see Table 6). Discrepancies
between municipal heads and shares are largest in companies dealing with energy,
water management, telecommunications, and social services, where municipalities
are somewhat ‘over-represented’ compared with the limited amount of money
that they directly put into the companies. As is clear from the last column of
Table 6, municipalities invest in these sectors indirectly, through public-owned
companies as well as through public consortia. Other categories of public actors,
such as Regions, Universities, Provinces (other local governments), Mountain
Communities and public agencies, do not participate significantly in public-service
corporations (at least not with direct financing), nor do they find substantial
numerical representation in them. Also public-law municipal enterprises, that is,
the old municipal instruments for managing public services that have survived the
wave of corporatisation, still represent 10% of public shareholders in water
and sanitation services, notwithstanding their irrelevant financial contribution to
that sector.
7 The analysis is limited to public and private actors, since the mixed ones may be easily reduced to two
varieties, that is, public–private companies and public–private consortia, with the latter only representing
5.8% of the mixed shareholders and 0.04% of mixed shares.
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Private shareholders. As regards private shareholders (Table 5), private companies
(joint-stock companies, LTD, etc.) form the majority in both financial and numerical
terms: in fact, on average they account for 55.8% of private shares, with the highest
percentages in telecommunications and transport, and they represent 50.1% of
private shareholders sitting on the boards. The importance of local enterprises, at
least in numerical terms, is also shown by the large presence of individuals (34.9%
on average) forming the majority of private heads in several domains (multi-utilities,
transports, and social services) in spite of their modest financial contributions. In
companies delivering social services, a large amount of private capital comes from
associations, cooperatives and foundations, while multi-national companies appear
to be most interested in corporations that combine waste management with energy
production and delivery. Private consortia, that is, groups of small-sized enterprises
at the local level, concentrate their financial contributions in local companies
delivering water and sanitation services and in multi-utility companies; and so do
banks, which are often local and well entrenched in the community.
In light of this evidence, it may be argued that the presence of private shareholders
in companies operating in specific sectors tends to overlap with the range of
stakeholders normally involved in the governance of the corresponding policy
areas. These become ‘parallel’ arenas in which public and private interests can
interact away from prying eyes. In such arenas, consolidated networks of local
public and private actors and traditional forms of interests intermediation
are reshaped through new organizational arrangements (corporate governance
mechanisms) and thanks to the frequent presence of new ‘market-oriented’ players,
such as prominent mixed or private companies delivering public services (also at the
national/transnational level). We may thus hypothesize that old and new forms of
governance coexist in municipal corporations and generate new configurations in
the domain of public services. However, aggregate data do not allow us to draw
reliable inferences concerning the shapes that such configurations may take, and the
resources that actors may spend to occupy central positions in the networks.
Who governs public services? Governance structure and members’ resources in six
companies’ BoDs.
In order to shed light on the concrete forms taken by the governance of local
utilities, and to analyse the variety of purposes pursued by Italian municipalities
through participation in the corporatisation game, in this section we complete the
picture sketched thus far by focusing on six particular municipal corporations. All
six companies are involved in the management of local utilities, and they have been
selected according to their importance in their respective regional contexts, so as to
account for the variety of national experiences: six companies from six different
regions, with different sizes and shareholding structures (see Table 8).
For the six companies, we examined the composition of their BODs (in office in
the summer of 2011) and the biographies of their members, in order to identify their
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Table 8. The six companies examined: basic data. Source: companies’ annual accounts and websites
Consiag Tuscany A2A Lombardy Hera Emilia Romagna Acea Latium G.O.R.I. Campania Elgasud Apulia
Year of
establishment
1974 (Joint-stock
since 2002)
2008 2002 1909 (Joint-stock
since 1998)
2002 2006
Shareholders 24 municipalities 2 municipalities
(55%)
2 European holdings
(7,5%)
35% on the market
187 municipalities
(61%)
Bank foundations
(6,5%)
32,5% on the market
municipalities of
Rome (51%)
1 European holding
(11,5%)
1 Italian construction
company (15%)
22,5% on the market
76 municipalities
(51%)
2 local municipal
companies (12%)
1 national company
(Acea, 37%)
joint venture of
2 local municipal
companies (51%)
1 European energy
company (Acea
Electrabel, 49%).
Share Capital € 143.581.967 € 1.629.110.744 € 1.115.013.754 € 1.098.898.884 € 44.999.970 € 200.000
Domains of activity Energy
Waste
Consultancy
Cultural activities
Building and
infrastructure
Water
Energy
Waste
Water
Energy
Waste
Water
Energy
Public lighting
Waste
Water Energy
Population served
(approx.)
500.000 2.2mln (waste)
1.3mln (gas)
1.1mln (electricity)
1mln (gas)
1.2mln (water)
7.7mln (electricity)
2.8mln (waste)
8.2mln in Italy
6.8mln abroad
1.4 mln na
Business area Local community Local and European
market
Local and national
market
Local, national and
global market
Local community Local community
Number of
companies in which
the company owns
shares
27 directly (2 fully
owned)
2 indirectly
38 directly (19 fully
owned)
7 indirectly
22 directly (7 fully
owned)
28 indirectly
42 directly (9 fully
owned)
43 indirectly
0 0
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Table 8. (Continued )
Consiag Tuscany A2A Lombardy Hera Emilia Romagna Acea Latium G.O.R.I. Campania Elgasud Apulia
Employees (2009) 143 1.568 4.574 532 704 5
Consolidated
employees (2009)
2.002 8.930 6.481 6.720 – –
Turnover 2009
(€*000)
45.378 736.100 1.393.100 146.707 148.102 32.500
Consolidated
turnover 2009
(€*000)
63.502 5.910.000 4.204.200 2.954.296 – –
Net profit 2009
(€*000)
4.183 206.000 52.400 53.622 3.445 71
Consolidated net
profit 2009 (€*000)
6.619 80.000 85.000 46.932 – –
Number of board
members (2010)
4 8 18 9 9 5
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professional profiles and their resources. The latter were distinguished on the basis
of a range of categories:
(1) Cognitive resources: (a) Managerial skills, that is, previous experience in the
direction and management of various kinds of companies, which may be high or low
according to the size and/or importance of such companies; (b) Professionalism, that is,
specific jobs and expertise in professional fields such as law, economics, engineering, etc.
(c) Bureaucratic skills, that is, competences relative to administrative procedures and
bureaucratic matters. Cognitive resources, and in particular managerial skills, are
hypothesized to provide the company with the know-how and expertise needed to
succeed in service delivery and in their market activities. They are normally considered
the ‘essence’ of a private-law company’s management.
(2) Political resources: (a) Political bargaining, that is, the consolidated ability to
negotiate with public and private stakeholders. People who hold institutional offices,
members of political parties, and prominent members of the various interest
organizations and civil associations are usually supposed to possess such skills.
(b) Networking, that is, the capacity of a person with multiple affiliations to connect
different domains, to connect the company with other companies, and to facilitate
exchanges of resources with other organizations. Political resources as a whole help
companies maintain close ties with their market sector, the community, and the (local)
political system.
(3) Economic resources: (a) ownership and organizational control, that is, the partial
ownership or total control of one or more companies (e.g. private companies and
individual owners). (b) Access to financial resources, that is, affiliation with banks or
other credit organizations. The presence on the BoDs of members with resources of this
kind may help the company gain direct access to financial resources and the credit
system.
(4) Personal resources, that is, Family ties and kinship with local politicians or other
prominent actors within the company’s environment. Obviously, the usefulness of this
kind of resource for the company’s market activities is less immediate.
The analysis of the specific mixes of resources possessed by the BoD’s members
can reveal which skills are privileged within the company and thus disclose the
dominant rationale behind the company's activities. It may also help detect the
existence of specific patterns of representation within municipal corporations.
Table 9 shows the variety of resources possessed by the board members of the six
companies examined. For each company, we ‘counted’ how many people had a
specific resource on the basis of their biographies and CVs. Of course, individual
members may have had more than one type of resource, which is why the ‘sum’ of
resources is always much higher than the number of board members.
The overall picture, although limited to a small number of cases, suggests that
three different kinds of arenas may develop within company boards, and in turn
may express the different purposes for which private-law companies are created and
used. These three arenas are a genuinely partisan one, an eminently local/territorial
one, and a hybrid arena in which business and politics co-exist.
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The partisan arena
In this case, the company’s board is made up of people from party organisations
and/or local institutions, such as local party leaders, former mayors or councillors,
etc. Consiag’s board exemplifies this kind of arena: all four members of the board
belong to the same centre-left party (the Democratic Party, which governs all the
municipalities that own the company), and they have previously held institutional
offices in those municipalities. The board thus serves as a sort of ‘clearing house’
to compensate those leaving (deliberately or otherwise) their political careers,
Furthermore, the board resembles an ‘inner circle’ dominated by the majority party
and in which local politicians can negotiate strategies and decisions in the absence of
control by other stakeholders and the political opposition, making use of private-
like instruments to create and reproduce political consensus. GORI’s board may
also be considered a partisan arena, although there are some differences with respect
to Consiag. In this case, in fact, representation within the board is allotted among all
the parties governing the municipalities that own the company, and party affiliation
Table 9. Resources of members of companies’ boards. Source: companies’ annual
accounts and websites
A2A
Company
(members of board)
Consiag
4
Executive
board
8
Supervisory
board
15
Hera
18
Acea
9
G.O.R.I.
9
Elgasud
5
Cognitive resources
Managerial skills
Low profile 7* 10 2* 4
High profile 6* 4 2* 6 2
Professionalism 1 1 3 2
Bureaucratic skills 1 1 1
Political resources
Political bargaining
Parties 4* 2 9* 2 6* 1*
Institutional offices 4* 3 5 1
Functional Representation 3 4 6 3* 1
Associations 2* 2 1* 1
Networking
Local 1* 5 8* 11 1* 2 1*
National and trans-national 6* 5 4 8 3 3
Economic resources
Ownership and organizational
control
1
Access to financial resources 1* 5* 4 4*
Personal resources
Family ties 1 1 1*
*Resource owned by the President.
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is combined with political resources of other kinds, such as networking with other
companies (due to the presence of Acea among the company’s shareholders)
and functional representation. A similar mix of party affiliation, networking,
and functional representation also characterizes Hera’s board, on which local
organisations play a particularly strong role.
The local/territorial arena
Hera’s board is also a good example of territorial representation. In fact, the
company is owned by 187 municipalities located in the six provinces of Bologna,
Modena, Ferrara, Forlì Cesena, Ravenna and Rimini, and its board is overly
large (18 members!) to assure representation to all those provinces. The board’s
members, except for the chairman (who is a top manager with substantial
experience in prominent national and international companies operating in the
utilities sector), have been politicians within local government, or have managerial
experience within former municipal undertakings (transferred into Hera), or have
worked in the local credit system. The composition thus reveals a complex mix of
territorial cleavages and multiple affiliations, which provide the company with
important links to the socio-economic environment, and at the same time guarantee
representation to a wide array of local stakeholders.
The hybrid arena
Political resources are also important in the boards of companies such as Acea, A2a,
and – to a lesser extent – Elgasud (indirectly controlled by Acea and Electrabel Ltd, a
multi-national company operating in the energy sector), whose members possess
relevant managerial skills. In these cases, the boards are composed of people with
hybrid profiles combining long-standing and significant managerial experience in
prominent national and international companies (often related to the public services
sector) with other resources – professional, economic and political – enabling them
(and the companies) to maintain useful linkages with both the local community
and other companies operating in the same markets. These distinctive, hybrid
configurations of the boards may provide the companies with opportunities to
act on two different levels: they can attend to efficiency while keeping an eye on
relationships with the local system of governance and politics.
In a diversified socio-economic and political context like Italy’s, differences
among the three types of arenas intersect with the peculiar patterns of political and
functional representation, which distinguish the six regions. For instance, in the
South the criteria used to select board members seem to be personal and somewhat
collusive (as shown in Table 9, e.g. the President of the Elgasud board is the
brother-in-law of the mayor of Trani). There also seems to be a political parcelling
rationale (e.g. all the political parties, from the centre-left to the extreme right, are
represented on GORI’s board). By contrast, in the two regions of the so-called
‘red zone’ of the country (Tuscany and Emilia Romagna, where almost all the
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municipalities have been governed continuously by the centre-left, closer attention
is paid to the inclusion of local stakeholders and to strengthening companies’ links
with the local political systems. In Lombardy and Latium, instead, the presence of
two large and strong municipalities like Milan and Rome among the shareholders
makes the two companies A2a and Acea more prone to act as market players, albeit
with different strategies. Probably due to proximity to the core of national politics,
and to the presence of several members belonging to the Roman social and
intellectual elite loyal to the various party leaders (and MPs), the mission of Acea’s
board is more to gain political control over the national water and electricity
markets, while the Milanese A2a’s mission is doubt wider and more oriented to the
international market.
Two observations may be made to conclude this section – albeit with some
caution given the small size of our sample. First, the profiles of board members are
far from being purely managerial, even in companies such as Acea and A2A, which
are prominent economic players in the national utilities market. Political resources
are crucial in managing all companies, confirming the hypothesis that municipally-
owned corporations are something other, or rather, something more, than sheer
policy instruments to increase profits or to improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of service delivery. Second, none of the six companies guarantees representation to
all potential stakeholders in the local utilities domain, whether in the shareholder
assemblies or on the BoDs, whether directly or indirectly. On the contrary, the BoDs
consist of managers, representatives of the industry, and credit systems, party
affiliates and political/administrative careerists, albeit with different degrees of
importance and territorial influence. The networks behind the corporate manage-
ment and provision of local utilities are thus highly exclusive, and may appear more
‘elitist’ than the ‘traditional’ democratic games based on interaction between local
elected administrators and stakeholders. In corporate arenas like those examined in
this article, in fact, trade unions as well as civil associations representing citizens/
users (and often the opposition parties) are de facto excluded from any meaningful
involvement in decision making, and in the implementation of services. Nor do
they have the concrete possibility to control the policy process or to ‘sanction’ the
decision makers. This of course raises fundamental questions as to the implications
that such governance settings may have for both the vertical and horizontal
dimensions of democratic accountability (Morlino, 1998). Consequently further
analysis based on case-studies and different methodological instruments, such as in
depth interviews and surveys of the actors involved in (and excluded from) the local
corporate utilities system, is necessary.
Concluding remarks
The starting hypothesis of this article was that corporatisation is not only a
business-like managerial policy tool; it also provides potential space for political
representation. We accordingly argued that corporate boards can also be places for
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local representation and that, in the case of Italy, the private-law companies
partially or totally owned bymunicipalities are attractive forums in which politicians,
entrepreneurs and interest groups can arrange policies. Hence, the fashionable NPM
framework inducing corporatisation in managerialist terms (market competition and
flexibility instead of the 'command and control' chain) has given rise to political
arenas where local power is reshaped under the guise of a managerialist strategy
(Pollitt et al., 2007). In light of the evidence, these 'new' corporations may be subse-
quently considered easy, prompt and autonomous arenas of representation, which
have developed alongside the institutional procedures and assemblies of representa-
tive democracy (see ‘Beyond management instruments: municipal enterprises as
opportunities for political “reinvention” in Italy’ section). In Italy, corporatisation
has been described as a phenomenon widespread in the country, although it is
characterized by heterodox implementation (e.g. municipalities as single owners of a
joint stock company, multiple levels of indirect ownership, application in a variety of
policy sectors other than public utilities). This feature reveals a widespread interest in
private-law companies by municipalities, even if with a meaning distant from the
stricter NPM interpretation. The evidence shows that corporations have been inter-
preted asmultifaceted tools withwhich to reinvent policy-making and to protect local
policies against environmental challenges.
As such, corporatisation has been stretched well beyond its original conception as
a business-oriented managerial instrument. It has become a flexible way to achieve
various different goals, including political representation. The variety of structures
and strategies used have induced us to analyse how public stakeholders, like
mayors, regard private-law companies as potential representative arenas into which
they may ‘invite’ all those attractive because of their resources for policy-making
(not necessarily directly concerning the policy issue of that company): money,
expertise, networking, party membership. Accordingly, the board of the company
may become an additional political space for coalitions and an unobtrusive place
for bargaining. This fact gives private stakeholders a chance to be represented in a
political arena external to democratic procedures and with very low cost in terms
of the money to be invested (see ‘Beyond management instruments: municipal
enterprises as opportunities for political “reinvention” in Italy’).
Indeed, the presence of private shareholders in companies operating in specific
sectors tends to overlap with the range of stakeholders normally involved in the
governance of the corresponding policy areas, thereby producing ‘parallel’ arenas
in which public and private interests can interact. In such arenas, consolidated
networks of local public and private actors and traditional forms of interest
intermediation are reshaped through new organizational arrangements (corporate
governance mechanisms) and thanks to the frequent presence of new ‘market-
oriented’ players, such as prominent mixed or private companies operating in
the delivery of public services. As such, municipalities are networked through
private companies instituted by public organizations using public money to recruit
private stakeholders in public policy.
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Secondly, all these arenas are not immediately accessible from outside. Rather,
they are largely closed and exclusive. Indeed, the companies' boards have become
inviting spaces for an emergent and innovative élite made up of managers, party
affiliates, and politico-administrative careerists, who are able to access the board by
virtue of their cognitive, political, networking, economic, and personal resources
(see ‘Who governs public services? Governance structure and members’ resources in
six companies’ BoDs’ section). In so doing, they shape specific networks behind
corporate management and the provision of local utilities, and are therefore more
exclusive than the usual élites selected through procedural democratic games. This
last evidence shows how corporatisation links businesspersons, professionals, and
politicians able to share power on representative boards in which selected interests
can be negotiated. Thus, corporatisation is a representative phenomenon also
because these elites vary widely according to the territorial and political context and
reproduce territorial, cultural and power cleavages: they are closed networks of
co-interested stakeholders. Access to these arenas is denied to all the political or
social actors that do not possess the necessary resources: citizens' civil associations,
trade unions, and all the potential stakeholders not deemed attractive by mayors
and the current members of the boards. Moreover, the private-law companies are
only loosely coupled to their owners. Municipalities are not always able to monitor
the performance of the companies, and information asymmetries may be important –
especially if we consider that municipal companies often are important investors in
other companies [see ‘Beyond management instruments: municipal enterprises
as opportunities for political “reinvention” in Italy’ and ‘Municipal corporations
as arenas of governance (and representation): public, private and “mixed” share-
holders’ sections]. The only instrument with which the elected members of the
municipal council can control the companies is a yearly report on their activities,
with no effective access to key information on management, capital, strategies,
or investments. For this reason, the private-law companies are relatively free in
their strategic planning and formally unaccountable in the public realm of local
democracy.
As a consequence, the company boards may be re-shaped in a local context at
the same time as innovative and multiform policy making milieu as well as
un-transparent and effective milieu to arrange politics. Unfortunately, these innovative
arenas are powerful but exclusive. They are potentially able to make decisions and to
be effective, but this happens without any direct democratic control, and far from any
participation by actors without the above-mentioned resources. No representation of
all potential stakeholders in the relevant domains is guaranteed: either in the share-
holder assemblies or on the BODs, either directly or indirectly.
Finally, corporatisation may become an additional space for political repre-
sentation, but, as observed in Italian case studies, it varies widely depending on the
territorial and political context, and it reproduces territorial, cultural, and power
cleavages. As shown in section ‘Who governs public services? Governance structure
and members’ resources in six companies’ BoDs’, this emerging variety of Italian
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municipal capitalism indirectly generates different practices of companies as
representative arenas ranging from a party system affiliation (partisan arena) to
territorial representation in a local perspective (local arena), and also including the
‘perfect mix’ of national and local, businessmen, and politicians (hybrid arena).
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